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Abstract—The article describes interference affecting the op-
eration of radiolocation and radionavigation devices used in
the air traffic surveillance systems, caused by the proximity of
building structures. The impact of a hypothetical structure on
the operation of primary and secondary air traffic surveillance
radars and DVOR/DME beacons was simulated. The results
of this simulation are presented in the form of airspace sectors
in which false identification of aircraft may occur, and where
it will not be possible to identify aircraft or use beacons due
to the certain portion of airspace being in the shadow cre-
ated by the structure. Analysis of the possibility of the PSR
radar receiver being blocked by a strong signal reflected from
a nearby building was performed as well.
Keywords—air traffic safety, environment obstacles, ground ra-
diolocalization systems.
1. Introduction
Civilian (and military) aviation authorities aim to ensure the
safety of personnel and passengers traveling by air. The de-
sired level of safety is ensured by complying with organiza-
tional rules and meeting applicable technical requirements.
Ground-based air traffic surveillance systems are an impor-
tant aspect of technical flight safety measures. Air traffic
control systems monitor aircraft traveling enroute, during
the departure and approach phase of the flight (around air-
ports) and at airports themselves. Air traffic surveillance
is performed with the use of various radio-electronic solu-
tions, such as radionavigation, radiolocation and air radio-
communication systems. Ground-based air traffic surveil-
lance hardware is usually located at airport premises, near
the runways, but may be also positioned at other locations
of key significance for air traffic control. Such hardware
interacts with devices installed aboard the aircraft.
Terrestrial radionavigation systems ecomprise, inter alia,
non-directional beacons (NDB), distance measuring equip-
ment (DME), VHF Omni Directional Range (VOR), and
VOR using the Doppler effect (DVOR) azimuth beacons,
markers (route beacons) and Instrument Landing System(s)
(ILS) – solutions made up of directional beacons that as-
sist crews while landing in low visibility conditions, or their
microwave versions, known as Microwave Landing System
(MLS). Ground-based radiolocation systems use radars to
indicate the position of the aircraft in airspace, they are
primary surveillance radars (PSRs), and to identify of air-
craft and provide much more information on it, they are
secondary surveillance radars (SSRs) [1].
Correct operation of air traffic surveillance systems is
crucial and their performance should not be affected by
any potential disturbances. The sources of such distur-
bances may include electromagnetic (active) sources, or
emission caused by environmental conditions (passive).
Specifications protecting radionavigation and radioloca-
tion systems against interference originating from various
sources are provided for in numerous documents published,
for instance, by the International Telecommunications
Union [2]–[6]. However, disturbance affecting the opera-
tion of ground-based air traffic surveillance devices, caused
by closely located structures, including various types of
buildings, is a problem as well. In some publications,
e.g. [7]–[9], the authors noted the potential impact that
man-made obstacles, such as buildings, may exert on the
operation of radars. However, they failed to present any
methods for analyzing the outcomes of such impact.
Structures present in close proximity of navigation systems
need to be positioned in a manner allowing to minimize
their negative impact. Some typical types of interference
include electromagnetic wave reflections and shadowing ef-
fects rendering specific portions of airspace unsuitable for
monitoring. Therefore, restrictions concerning the height
of buildings existing in close proximity to these radio de-
vices are introduced. As it is impossible to do away with
all structures in the vicinity of the abovementioned devices
(e.g. airport terminals, hangars, air traffic control towers,
or even offices and hotels), it is recommended that their
impact on the operation of such systems be studied in or-
der to gather information about the potential adverse types
of impact.
This article covers the effects of passive impact that struc-
tures may exert on the operation of air traffic surveillance
systems. A scenario in which fictitious structures impact
the operation of hypothetical radiolocation devices located
within the airport perimeter will be simulated as well, and
an analysis of the effects of such impact will be performed.
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In the literature, e.g. in [10]–[12], theoretical consider-
ations related to reflections of waves generated by SSR
radars, caused by ground-based objects, as well as to the
scattering of radio waves by wind turbines may be found.
However, it is the practical effects of these reflections, as
well as the outcomes of radio wave scattering and shadow-
ing phenomena that are extremely important and interesting
for the aviation authorities.
2. Effects of Disturbance Affecting Air
Traffic Surveillance Systems
False aircraft locations caused by the reflection of elec-
tromagnetic waves are one of the most serious effects of
disturbance created by structures present in the vicinity of
terrestrial radionavigation or radiolocation equipment. In
addition to such false locations, coordinate- and altitude-
related errors in determining the azimuth of and the dis-
tance to beacons may be experienced as well. These phe-
nomena are caused by the multi-path propagation of the
radio wave in scenarios in which other objects (structures),
reflecting the emitted signals are located in the vicinity of
the tracking facilities or the tracked object.
Fig. 1. False location of a flying object identified when the radio
wave is reflected by a building [1].
Such cases are illustrated in Fig. 1. Radio shadowing caused
by structures is another adverse effect. In this scenario,
certain space exists that cannot be reached by radio waves
emitted from the transmitters of radiolocation devices, as
it is located below the line of sight. The radio shadow-
ing phenomenon is somewhat alleviated by tropospheric
refraction curving the trajectory of radio waves. Antennas
of radiolocation and radio navigation devices are designed
in such a way that their vertical radiation pattern covers
a large range of elevation angles in relation to the Earth’s
surface, i.e. both small angles for low-flying and distant air-
craft and large angles for aircraft flying high and close to
the antenna. However, the resulting radio shadowing effect
limits radar or beacon coverage, as radio waves fail to reach
flying objects located in a certain part of the airspace. On
the other hand, from the point of view of aircraft, objects
located in the proximity of ground-based radio navigation
systems weaken their signals which cannot be received, in
some cases, by planes. Due to high operating frequency
used, the diffraction of radio waves observed at the edges of
buildings is small, but the radio wave is almost completely
suppressed in the radio shadow zone. Therefore, obstruc-
tion zones are defined, in radiolocation, both in terms of
their horizontal and vertical planes. These sectors are the
portions of airspace in which aircraft are undetectable or
where ground equipment is undetectable by aircraft.
Contact with ground-based radiolocation systems may also
be lost due to radar receiver blocking (saturation). This may
be the case in a situation in which a high-power radar pulse
is generated and directed towards objects located nearby.
The signal reflected by these objects returns into the aper-
ture of the radar antenna. Because of the high power of
the reflected pulse signal, a short break in the receiver’s
operation may occur due to the saturation of its front-end
circuit. This phenomenon is quite short-lasting due to the
duration of the reflected signal pulse and the rotation speed
of the radar antenna. But even such short breaks in the
operation of the receiver make it impossible to distinguish
objects located further away, thus temporarily preventing
objects positioned at greater distances from being identi-
fied. The receiver blocking phenomenon applies only to
PSR radars in which the emission and reception of pulsed
signals occurs at the same frequency. SSR radar receivers
are not blocked by reflections from nearby objects, as they
operate based on a different principle. Such radars use two
different frequencies for transmitting and receiving.
To avoid blocking a PSR radar, the power of the signal
arriving at its receiver, after being reflected from a (nearby)
structure Po, should be lower than the receiver’s saturation
power Pbl .
Po ≤ Pbl . (1)
Po may be determined by:
Po = Ppr +Gr (Θr)−Lb−L f o +M−R [dBm] , (2)
where:
Ppr – equivalent power radiated by the radar isotropically
(in a pulse) [dBm],
Gr(Θr) – energy gain of the receiving antenna in relation
to the isotropic antenna [dBi],
Θr – antenna elevation angle considering the slope of the
antenna pattern,
Lb – attenuation of the radio path on the incident wave and
reflected from the object towards the antenna [dB],
L f o – receiver feeder attenuation [dB],
M – margin factor considering multipath propagation [dB],
R – object reflection coefficient [dB].
In most cases, the M factor may be left out because the
receiver is always blocked when the reflecting objects are
very close to the radar (are located in the near field zone).
Therefore, it is assumed that the object from which the radio
wave is reflected, being capable of blocking the receiver, is
not located in the near field zone of the PSR radar antenna.
The worst conditions for blocking the radar receiver occur
when waves propagate in free space, without scattering,
atmospheric absorption and when the object’s reflection
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coefficient equals 0 dB. When needed, different reflection
coefficient values for various frequencies and wave polar-
izations, as well as for different types of building materials
may be calculated according to the methodology presented
in [13].
It should be emphasized that modern PSR radars are
equipped with a sensitivity time control (STC) device used
to suppress strong signals generated by reflections at very
short distances. Nevertheless, any structure present in close
proximity to the radar may reflect radio waves. Hence, an
analysis of a scenario in which the receiver may be poten-
tially blocked by reflections should always be performed.
3. Simulation of Interferences Caused
by Structures
Simulations determining the impact of nearby buildings on
the operation of ground air traffic control devices should al-
low to designate radio-limited zones. When designing stru-
ctures present in the vicinity of radiolocation devices, such
an analysis should be carried out in order to obtain infor-
mation about potentially incorrect operation of equipment.
In order to assess spatial limitations of radar (loss of cover-
age along a specific direction and at a specific height above
ground level) caused by the formation of radio shadow
zones, the solid of the planned structure should be mod-
eled as a terrain obstacle. Next, the elevation angles and
azimuths of the beam radiated by the radar incident on the
analyzed structure should be determined. Such a procedure
allows to identify areas in which radio shadows caused by
this structure are formed, i.e. areas in which radio visibil-
ity is reduced. Similarly, areas with reflections that may
result in false aircraft locations being determined may be
identified.
In order to simulate disturbances affecting the operation
of radiolocation devices and caused by ground structures,
a fictitious building, i.e. hotel complex, was modeled in
the vicinity of one of the inactive airports in Lower Sile-
sia, Poland. Fictitious PSR and SSR radars, as well as
DVOR/DME beacons, were modeled, too. Their layout is
shown in Fig. 2. Calculations related to airspace zones in
Fig. 2. Ground-based aviation equipment and hotel buildings
modeled on the DTM map base.
which radio shadows may appear and in which locations of
aircraft may be determined falsely relied upon a detailed
digital map (digital terrain model – DTM).
Tables 1–3 present selected basic parameters of typical PSR
and SSR radars, as well as of DVOR/DME beacons used
for the purpose of the simulation described in this article.
Table 1
Selected basic parameters of a PSR radar
Operating frequency [MHz] 2800
Mechanical antenna tilt [◦] 0
Antenna gain – high beam [dBi] 32
Antenna gain – low beam [dBi] 33
Pulse radiation power [kW] 32
Height of the electrical center
of the antenna [m] a.g.l.
37
Table 2
Selected basic parameters of the SSR radar
Operating frequency [MHz] 1030/1090
Mechanical antenna tilt [◦] 0
Height of the electrical center
of the antenna [m] a.g.l.
30
Table 3
Selected basic parameters of the DVOR/DME
Type of DVOR antenna Alford slot antenna
Type of DME antenna Omnidirectional
Height of the electrical center
of the DVOR antenna [m] a.g.l.
4.7
Height of the electrical center
of the DME antenna [m] a.g.l.
8
3.1. Simulation of the Shape of the Radio Shadow Zone
Caused by Hotel Buildings
Fig. 3. Azimuth range in which the horizontal diaphragm/radio
shadowing will occur for PSR radar.
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Fig. 4. Azimuth range in which the horizontal diaphragm/radio
shadowing will occur for SSR radar.
By simulating the building’s impact on the operation of
PSR and SSR radars, a radio shadow zone, horizontal and
vertical diaphragms of PSR and SSR radars, as well as
areas with potential range losses could be determined. Fig-
ures 3 and 4 show the calculated azimuth ranges with the
horizontal diaphragm of PSR and SSR radars.
Figures 5 and 6 show the calculated azimuth ranges in
which the vertical diaphragm of PSR and SSR radars will
occur. The following designators are used in these draw-
ings:
• Φ – angle of deviation from the direction of the max-
imum radiation,
Fig. 5. Azimuth range in which the vertical diaphragm/radio
shadowing will occur for PSR radar. (see the digital edition for
color images)
Fig. 6. Azimuth range in which the vertical diaphragm/radio
shadowing will occur for SSR radar.
• Ψ – angle of the building’s facade,
• dashed red line – height of the electrical center of
the antenna above ground level,
• dashed green line – direction of maximum radiation,
• solid blue line – radar antenna’s direct line of sight.
Using the radiation characteristics of the radar antenna sys-
tem, the areas of the airspace (with height being a function
of distance) in which radar coverage is lost have been deter-
mined. These areas were designated for both PSR radiation
beams, i.e. for the upper and lower beam, and for the SSR
radar radiation beams serving the downlink and uplink.
Fig. 7. The area (marked red) in which PSR radar coverage is
lost due to the screening effect caused by the hotel building (radar
high beam).
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Fig. 8. The area (marked green) in which PSR radar coverage is
lost due to the screening effect caused by the hotel building (radar
high beam).
Figures 7 and 8 show the area with PSR radar coverage
lost, while Figs. 9 and 10 show the area with SSR radar
coverage lost.
Fig. 9. The area (marked blue) in which SSR radar coverage is
lost due to the screening effect caused by the hotel building (beam
serving the uplink).
Fig. 10. The area (marked green) in which the SSR radar cover-
age is lost due to the screening effect caused by the hotel building
(beam serving the downlink).
Table 4 presents the boundaries of the space in which loss
of the PSR radar coverage is expected (with height above
ground level being a function of distance), occurring within
the azimuth range of 17.1–36.8◦.
Table 4















Table 5 shows the boundaries of the space in which loss
of the SSR radar coverage is expected (with height above
ground level being a function of distance), occurring within
the azimuth range of 317.3–340◦.
Table 5

















3.2. Identification of Zones with Potential False
Detection of Flying Objects
Fig. 11. Calculated azimuths at which primary radar beam will
reflect from the hotel buildings in the horizontal plane.
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Fig. 12. Calculated azimuths values at which secondary radar
beam will reflect from the hotel buildings in the horizontal plane.
In the scenario in which radar beams may be reflected by
the hotel buildings, thus leading to false determination of
the position of flying objects, calculations of horizontal and
vertical plane azimuth ranges were performed. Figures 11
and 12 show the ranges of radar beam reflections from hotel
buildings in the horizontal plane, for PSR and SSR radars.
In the case of primary radar, a location error may occur in
the azimuth ranges of 109–124◦ and 311–311.2◦.
For secondary radar, incorrect detection due to radar beam
may occur in the azimuth range of 167–191.6◦.
Fig. 13. Calculated azimuth range at which primary radar beam
will reflect from the hotel buildings in the vertical plane.
Figures 13 and 14 show the range of radar beam reflections
from hotel buildings in the vertical plane, for PSR and SSR
radar, respectively. The markings of angles and lines are
the same as in Figs. 5 and 6.
Fig. 14. Calculated azimuth range at which secondary radar
beam will reflect from the hotel buildings in the vertical plane.
3.3. Simulation of Disturbances Affecting the Operation
of DVOR/DME Beacons
When considering limitations affecting the operation of
a beacon, an analysis of its location in relation to build-
ings should be performed in order to determine the form
of the diaphragm/radio shadowing. It causes loss of the
beacon’s operating range. Apart from being diffracted at
the edges of the structure, it was assumed that the radio
wave is completely suppressed in the shadow zone, mak-
ing it impossible to identify the beacon of flying objects.
In addition, it is necessary to establish the boundaries of
the airspace in which false detections of the beacon’s po-
sition may take place due to reflections from the walls of
the building.
Results of analyses concerned with the existence of the
radio shadowing zone are presented in the Figs. 15–16.
Figure 15 shows the determined loss of operating range of
Fig. 15. Calculated azimuths range at which the horizontal
diaphragm of DVOR/DME beacons will occur.
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DVOR/DME beacons due to the diaphragm/radio shadow-
ing caused by the hotel buildings in the horizontal plane.
The loss of beacon’s range (no identification possible) may
occur within the azimuth range of 254.07–257.38◦.
Figure 16 shows the determined loss of operating range of
DVOR/DME beacons due to the diaphragm/radio shadow-
ing caused by the hotel buildings in the vertical plane.
Fig. 16. Vertical azimuths below which signals of DVOR/DME
beacons are obscured.
It was determined that in this case the loss of the ability to
identify the beacon in the vertical plane, due radio shadow-
ing, will be experienced below the elevation angle of 2.29◦
and for 2.43◦ for DME and DVOR, respectively.
Results of the analysis allowing to delineate the portion
of the airspace in which flying objects may erroneously
determine the location of beacons due to the reflections
from the building, are shown in Figs. 17 and 18.
Fig. 17. Azimuth range within which horizontal reflections of
the beams generated by DVOR/DME beacons from hotel buildings
will occur.
Figure 17 illustrates, in the horizontal plane, the range of
reflection of the signal beam from DVOR/DME beacons.
In this case, the azimuth range of the reflected beacon beam
is: 66.57–68.92◦.
Finally, Fig. 18 presents the range of reflection of the beam
generated by DVOR/DME beacons, from hotel buildings,
in the vertical plane.
Fig. 18. Vertical azimuths below which beams of radio waves
generated by DVOR/DME beacons are reflected by the building.
In this case, reflections of the radio waves generated by the
beacons in the vertical plane, resulting from the presence
of an obstacle in the form of a hotel building, will occur
below the elevation angles of 2.29◦ and 2.43◦ for DME
and DVOR, respectively. It means that low-flying aircraft
may falsely determine the location of these beacons while
traveling within such a range.
3.4. Analysis of Scenarios in which the PSR Radar
Receiver is Potentially Blocked
Here, an analysis of the scenario in which the PSR radar
circuit is potentially blocked upon receiving a strong signal
reflected from nearby objects is performed with the worst
propagation conditions taken into consideration and assum-
ing that the beam radiated by the radar is fully reflected
from these objects.
In this case, the radio path loss for the signal emitted by the
radar and reflected from the object can be determined by
the well-known formula for free-space basic transmission
loss [16]:
Lb = Lb f = 32.4+20log f +20logd [dB] , (3)
where f is the frequency in [MHz] and d is the distance in
[km].
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Knowing the distance between the PSR radar and the nearby
object, and being aware of the height of the radar antenna’s
electric center and the height of the object concerned, one
may assess whether the radar receiver will be blocked by
the reflection of the radiated beam.
Assuming the typical parameters of a PSR radar:
Ppr = 32 kW = 75.1 dBm, f = 2800 MHz, Gr(θr) =
33.0 dBi and L f o = 2 dB, and using the distance from
the radar antenna to the nearest building of approx. 693 m,
the loss of free-space path from the radar to the object is:
Lb f = 32.4+20log 2800+20log(2×0.693)
= 32.4+68.9+2.8= 104.1 dB . (4)
Using the relative decrease in the gain of the receiving
antenna, observed as the distance towards the object de-
creases (calculated based on the vertical characteristics of
the PSR radar), for an incidence angle of 0◦ in relation to
the azimuth of maximum radiation (3 dB), the total gain
of this antenna towards the considered building will be
33.0− 3 = 30.0 dB. With the assumed reflection coeffi-
cient of R = 1 (0 dB), the power of the signal received by
the radar after reflection by the building is:
Po = 75.1+30.0−104.1−2−0= −1.0 dBm . (5)
According to [4], the average saturation level of an air traffic
control (ATC) radar receiver is equal to Pbl = 13 dBm.
Thus, according to Eq. (2), the received signal power ob-
tained above, after reflection from a (near) object Po is by
14 dB lower than the saturation power of the radar’s receiver
Pbl. In the scenario under consideration, the building will
not block the operation of the PSR radar.
4. Structure-related Restrictions
Imposed by ICAO
In order to reduce the probability of disturbances affecting
the operation of ground-based air navigation equipment,
caused by the close proximity of various building structures
and radio shadowing, the International Civil Aviation Orga-
nization (ICAO), has defined the recommended minimum
distances of radionavigation, radiolocation and air commu-
nication devices from nearby buildings [14]. The methodol-
ogy relied upon for determining the boundaries of off-limits
areas, i.e. the sizes of protection zones around ground-
based air navigation equipment, is presented in Fig. 19,
while the distances applicable to various types of such de-
vices are shown in Table 6. It should be noted that apart
from various types of structures, no other objects (mo-
bile and stationary, permanent or temporary), terrain faults
or vegetation of any kind should be present in the pro-
tected zones. If a structure needs to be positioned inside
the protection zone, it is necessary to analyze its impact
on the operation of each of the ground-based devices in
operation.
Fig. 19. Protection zones for aviation ground equipment [14].
Some general guidelines (but not having the form of for-
mal standards) regarding the presence of buildings in the
vicinity of DVOR/DME devices are also presented in [15].
ICAO recommends to designate protection zones around ra-
diolocation devices and to define restricted areas in which
the no structures should be present. These recommenda-
tions should be obeyed into practice. However, in some
cases, when it is not possible to avoid the construction
of such structures, it is necessary to identify those sectors
of the airspace in which proper operation of radiolocation
equipment may be affected.
Table 6
Data from Fig. 19 for selected radionavigation and radiolocation devices












Origin of cone and axis
of cylinders at ground level
Distance measuring
equipment DME N
300 1.0 3000 n/a n/a Base of antenna
Doppler VHF omni-
directional range DVOR
600 1.0 3000 10000 52 Centre of antenna systems
Primary surveillance
radar PSR
500 0.25 15000 n/a n/a Base of antenna
Secondary surveillance
radar SSR
500 0.25 15000 n/a n/a Base of antenna
* for wind turbines only
39
Maciej J. Grzybkowski, Daniel Niewiadomski, and Marcin Mora
5. Conclusions
Data sourced from ground-based radiolocation and radion-
avigation systems are mainly used to identify aircraft, to
determine their current location in the airspace and some
of their flight-related parameters. The position of radionav-
igation devices on the ground is determined by the aircraft
as well. It may be difficult or outright impossible to ob-
tain such information when building structures and other
man-made objects are located in the vicinity of air traffic
control stations. In extreme cases, as a result of reflections
of radio waves radiated by radar antennas, false positions
of the aircraft may be presented. On the other hand, the
radio shadowing phenomenon caused by the existence of
terrain, artificial and natural obstacles, results in the op-
eration of radiolocation devices being subjected to some
spatial limitations.
The effects of such impact are presented based on the ex-
ample of a fictitious building located in the vicinity of
a runway of a closed airport in Poland. Those sectors of
the airspace in which the positions of aircraft may be de-
termined falsely or cannot be determined altogether due
to radio shadowing have been established. The probabil-
ity of blocking the radar receiver by radio waves it gener-
ates being reflected from a nearby object, was analyzed as
well. In addition, those airspace sectors have been iden-
tified where it would be impossible for aircraft to iden-
tify the position of radio beacons due to the formation of
dead zones (radio shadowing) caused by the presence of
a building.
The methods relied upon for analyzing the impact of sur-
roundings on the operation of radiolocation and radion-
avigation systems, as presented in this article, may fa-
cilitate forecasting unfavorable phenomena adversely af-
fecting the operation of these systems (in a scenario in
which buildings already exist in the vicinity of airports)
and may also contribute to eliminating them at the design
stage.
The calculation results presented indicate that the dimen-
sions of their projection on the plane perpendicular to the
direction of the radar devices were as small as possible
(surface area and height).
In such scenario, the radio shadow created by the building
will be minimized. In addition, the value of the angle
at which false readouts indicating the position of flying
objects or beacons will be minimized as well.
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